Mark Tyrell at CTLab proposes an interesting definition of asymmetric warfare, based not on differential in capacity / tactics, but on whether or not an intersubjective understanding of the game rule-sets exists between a party to a conflict:
Within the broad definition of a game, i.e. the acceptance of underlying principles, any conflict where the "players" accept those principles and operate according to them will be, by definition, "symmetric" because of that agreement. Conflicts which a), do not accept those principles, and b), include "battlespaces" beyond the "rules" are, by definition, "asymmetric".I really like this, but am puzzled by the example he provides:
Thus, for example, al Qaeda accepts a definition of media and symbol system regardless of geographic boundaries as the primary "battlespace" (workspace), while Coalition forces use the concept of bounded geography as the primary battlespace. This is a classic example of an asymmetric conflict; it is "asymmetric" because the players are using different workspaces and different game rules.Is it so cut and dry? The USG’s strategy has also moved far beyond the concept of bounded geography: it has conceived of its battle as “global” from the beginning, and has extended that “battle” to areas as diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia or the many “ghost ships” plying the high seas carrying detainees from this global war. Even the language it uses and rule-sets on which it draws suggest not only a presumption that the war is unconventional, but an insistent reliance on “post-modern” tactics and discourse as well. Moreover, al-Qaeda is not alone in waging war through media-space: the USG’s elaborate “hearts and minds” campaign is central to its efforts (if not necessarily any more effective than al-Qaeda’s).
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