What's so Asymmetrical About the GWOT?

Mark Tyrell at CTLab proposes an interesting definition of asymmetric warfare, based not on differential in capacity / tactics, but on whether or not an intersubjective understanding of the game rule-sets exists between a party to a conflict:

Within the broad definition of a game, i.e. the acceptance of underlying principles, any conflict where the "players" accept those principles and operate according to them will be, by definition, "symmetric" because of that agreement. Conflicts which a), do not accept those principles, and b), include "battlespaces" beyond the "rules" are, by definition, "asymmetric".

I really like this, but am puzzled by the example he provides:

Thus, for example, al Qaeda accepts a definition of media and symbol system regardless of geographic boundaries as the primary "battlespace" (workspace), while Coalition forces use the concept of bounded geography as the primary battlespace. This is a classic example of an asymmetric conflict; it is "asymmetric" because the players are using different workspaces and different game rules.

Is it so cut and dry? The USG’s strategy has also moved far beyond the concept of bounded geography: it has conceived of its battle as “global” from the beginning, and has extended that “battle” to areas as diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia or the many “ghost ships” plying the high seas carrying detainees from this global war. Even the language it uses and rule-sets on which it draws suggest not only a presumption that the war is unconventional, but an insistent reliance on “post-modern” tactics and discourse as well. Moreover, al-Qaeda is not alone in waging war through media-space: the USG’s elaborate “hearts and minds” campaign is central to its efforts (if not necessarily any more effective than al-Qaeda’s).

Al-Qaeda Today

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence has just released its assessment of the intentions and capabilities of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, seven years after the start of the war on terror.

Key points:

* The core Al Qaeda leadership remains in place, but it is still far from recovering the position of strength it enjoyed in 2001.

* There has been a considerable backlash against Al Qaeda-inspired violence across the Muslim world, with the result that even in places where Al Qaeda used to be highly active - such as Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi-Arabia - its campaign has lost traction and influence.

* The one geographical area where Al Qaeda has retained influence, or even consolidated or increased its standing over the last three years, is the Afghan-Pakistan border region.

* The key to defeating Al Qaeda will be to undermine its local base in the Afghan-Pakistan border area.

* It will be important to promote the drift of the Afghan Taliban away from Al Qaeda, which could be achieved by allowing President Karzai more political room to negotiate a deal.

* Al Qaeda will aim to provoke further intervention by foreign forces, knowing that this is the one thing all the tribes will combine to oppose.

Entire paper available here.

Al-Qaeda, America, and Child Soldiers

An ostensible al-Qaeda recruiting video was released by the US military last week depicting the training of young boys as kidnappers and gunmen.



Is this an authentic video or a propaganda film by the US military? It doesn't strain the imagination to think of al-Qaeda training youngsters, but the timing of the video's release is certainly interesting. Could it be aimed at drawing Americans' anti-child-soldiers sentiment toward our enemy, and away from the fact that the US military is preparing to prosecute Omar Khadr, a Guantanamo detainee who was only 15 when he was captured on the battlefield. Under US treaty obligations (the US signed the Optional Protocol to the CRC in 2002), Omar Khadr should not be tried as an adult, but this is unlikely to save him.

For what it's worth I'm not sure I agree with either position. The 18-years cut-off point below which it is supposedly unethical to recruit persons is a arbitrary Western construct. In many societies, including areas of Central Asia, young men reach fighting age much sooner, just as young women are married off in their teen years. We may object to this, but the mere evidence of such training doesn't by itself signify a lack of "civilization" on the part of al-Qaeda. I think it's much more important what these young lads are being trained to do.

As for Khadr. His lawyers argue he should not be tried at all. But is that appropriate? If the alternative is to rot in Gitmo without a trial like the other several hundred inmates, I'm not sure Khadr wouldn't prefer to have his day in court.