Was Russia Exercising a Responsibility to Protect?

With Russia justifying its actions in Georgia through reference to the Canadaian "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, it's worth reminding ourselves what this doctrine actually says about international interventions to protect civilians. This doctrine, first laid out in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and later endorsed by the international community in the 2005 Millennium Document, begins by spelling out the "threshold requirements" for such an intervention - in other words, the conditions under which human rights abuses inside a state justify grounds for breaching the territorial integrity of that state through the use of force. Such an intervention must be in response to:

"large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

large scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape."

The report demurs on what constitutes "large-scale loss of life"; and if it was justifiable for NATO to enter Kosovo after only a few hundred Kosovar Albanian civilians had been killed, then it might be said that Russia has something like a valid claim in this case.

But the R2P doctrine is not simply a green light for great powers to violate small states' territorial integrity whenever they can reasonably claim civilians are at risk. Rather, it carefully balances humanitarian concerns with the UN Charter regime. Intervening governments must not only demonstrate just cause, but they must meet six other criteria as well:

Right Intention: The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering...

Last Resort: Every diplomatic and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis must have been explored.

Proportional Means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question.

Reasonable Prospects: Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success, that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention in the first place.

Anyone can see that Russia's intervention satisfied the last of these criteria quite nicely. And although the jury is still out, for the sake of argument let us accept Russia's claim that the Georgian government's crackdown on separatists in S. Ossetia was indiscriminate and thus constituted just cause for an intervention. Even if so, it is hard to argue that Russia's means have been proportionate to its goals, that Russia exhausted any non-military avenues first, or that Russia has actually acted solely out of humanitarian objectives.

Perhaps most importantly is the question of right authority: who decides on the legitimacy of such a move? The Commission recognized the validity of such arguments, then made by Russia and China, that a humanitarian intervention norm would create a slippery slope toward the dissolution of the non-aggression norm entirely. So they devoted an entire chapter to the question of the authority to determine whether such an intervention should take place. It first stresses that to be genuine, humanitarian intervention must be multilateral, not unilateral; that it ought to be endorsed by the Security Council; and failing this (as it did in the case of Kosovo and now Darfur) could be legitimized under a Uniting for Peace resolution in the General Assembly. Point being, a single state exercising this "responsibility" on its own, without even a discussion among its peers, would negate the concept entirely.

Specious Russia's claims may be, but it is heartening to see them made. Paying lip service to a new international norm, even as a smoke-screen, legitimizes that norm. But it also provides the international community with an opportunity to apply and clarify the norm itself. This is greatly needed in the case of R2P, and the events in the Caucasus provide a useful test case.

Why Not Save the Children?

According to the AP, Save the Children has reported that thousands of children in Myanmar face imminent starvation if food is not distributed quickly. The Myanmar government has permitted relief supplies to enter the country, but will not allow aid workers to distribute them. Although it claims it will distribute them itself, there have been reports that the military is hoarding relief supplies and that deaths from malnourishment and communicable disease among the most vulnerable are rising.

The situation led France to suggest last week that armed intervention might be warranted. This question has been taken up by Peter Howard in a post at Duck of Minerva, titled "Why Not Invade Burma"? Commenters to the post make various arguments against, most on pragmatic grounds.

"'Junta.' Do we have a Junta? Or is it just them?"

"Geography. There are certainly worse places to fight in the world. But not many."

"I think the equally interesting question here is how on earth the French government thought this was even remotely feasible, simply from a logistical and military point of view."

Hank of Eclectic Meanderings asks the important prior question:

"Is it legal? Burma is not developing weapons of mass destruction; it is not attacking a neighbor. It connot even threaten a neighbor. It just wants to mind it's own bussiness without outside intervention. The UN charter guarantees National Sovereignty."

The answer is that sovereignty ain't what it used to be. The concept has been progressively redefined to be contingent on a responsibility to protect one's people. This principle was agreed to by consensus in the 2005 UN Millennium Outcome Document, and while it's not binding one can argue that it enshrines a new understanding of sovereignty that could be invoked in this case.

Also, the UN Security Council can override sovereignty anytime 2/3 of its members can agree without a veto from a Permanent Member. (Though it's likely China would veto in this case.)

The humanitarian case for an intervention here is at least as compelling as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1991. The US government and a few other nations, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, deployed forces to ensure the distribution of aid to starving famine victims. The operation went sour when the began to fight back; but in the meantime numerous civilian lives were saved.

An invasion of Myanmar would have to be just that, and would involve many of the very logistical and political drawbacks mentioned; but these should not be confused with a moral argument for standing by while children starve to death because a brutal regime is standing by indifferently. There is every ethical rationale for doing something more than continuing to negotiate; there is simply, as Peter explains in his post, no political will.

Learning from the past

Came across this old Dr. Seuss cartoon from the 30s. Maybe what the Save Darfur coalition needs is some cartoonists.

It's Realpolitik, Stupid

Warren Hoge offered a grim assessment in Sunday's New York Timesof the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, popularized in UN circles:

"Three years after the United Nations adopted a groundbreaking resolution to help it intervene to stop genocide, even longtime supporters of the rule acknowledge that it has not helped the organization end the violence in Darfur.

The General Assembly resolution, approved in 2005, held nations responsible for shielding their citizens from mass atrocities and established the right of international forces to step in if nations did not fulfill this new "responsibility to protect."

The United Nations has tried to take the lead in Darfur, the crisis-ridden region in western Sudan. But it has been stymied by the failure of major member states to fulfill promises to support action and by the intransigence of the Sudanese government.

In addition, countries with advanced militaries have not come forward to answer United Nations appeals for the sophisticated aviation and logistics assistance that the force needs.

Darfur, in short, has shown that there is a great difference between gaining acceptance for a working theory and making the theory work."

Well, duh. No one who lobbied for the R2P thought that simply having the norm codified would lead to its non-selective implementation. New rules aren't simply magic bullets. Historically, genocides have been stopped where a powerful state with the means and motive (usually ulterior) stepped in.

But to say the R2P doctrine hasn't ended the slaughter in Darfur is to mischaracterize what was gained in 2005. R2P was never meant to end genocide itself. It was meant to legitimize such efforts when and where they happened to occur. It was meant as a response to China and Russia in Security Council deliberations, who have historically argued against any right of intervention in the internal affairs of states.

Judging by the fact that these countries now routinely abstain, rather than block, resolutions to try to 'do something' in places like Darfur, I'd say R2P is having an effect. That more isn't being done isn't for lack of international legitimacy. It is for lack of true political will.