Responsibility to Protect

I was recently asked to post a bit of background on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (aka R2P).

This concept was first articulated by an Independent Commission established by the Government of Canada to attempt to resolve the tension between the norm of state sovereignty, on which the entire UN Charter regime rests, and the protection of civilian populations from grave human rights abuses at the hands of their own governments – a parallel set of principles also espoused by the UN Charter preamble and articulated in two further sets of treaties – human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The tension between these principles had become evident in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, which posed a choice between two competing principles: 1) do something to prevent what many thought to be a looming genocide and 2) do something legally. Under the UN Charter regime, military intervention in a sovereign state is never legal unless authorized by the UN Security Council, which requires a 2/3 vote and no vetoes by those holding Permanent Status on the Council (the US, UK, Russia, China and France). Because the Council is split on the legitimacy of intervention even in cases of genocide, such consensus is rarely forthcoming.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), peopled by prominent scholars and jurists, produced a landmark report in 2000, redefining sovereignty as responsibility. Previous, sovereignty had been understood as a claim to absolute autonomy within one’s territorial borders. The R2P doctrine places the burden of proof on the state to govern responsibly so as to protect its civilian population. If it fails to do this or directly threatens its citizens’ bodily integrity rights, it sacrifices its claim to sovereignty; at that point, the responsibility to protect is transferred to the international community.

The seemingly brilliant concept has worked well as a rhetorical device. It has been legitimated through adoption in a number of UN documents, including the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 and the 2005 UN Millennium Conference Outcome Document. However, it does not really provide a road-map to the mechanism for triggering a legitimate intervention. The criteria it gives for an appropriate intervention do not improve on just war theory, which dates back at least to Augustine. Its lofty language of “just cause,” “right intention,” “last resort,” “proporotional means” and “reasonable prospects” already framed the debate on Kosovo. And the section on “what do to when the Security Council will not act” lists primarily the exact same types of non-coercive operations that currently exist as band-aid efforts to mitigate suffering of civilians in armed conflicts.

Since “grave human rights abuses” are in the eye of the beholder, the big question of who should decide when violations of sovereignty are justified remains unanswered and a subject of controversy among governments. This is the context for Nikolas K. Gvosdev’s recent suggestion at the Washington Realist that the norm be revised to apply only to non-democracies. But I think that idea only skirts the same issue: who should decide who counts as a democracy?

Those Self-Righteous Americans

Dan Drezner has written, in a new article based on available polling data, that Americans - the people, not the government - pay lip-service to multilateralism but don’t respect it for its own sake. One example he gives particularly caught my attention. Citing Kohut and Stokes’ book America Against the World, Drezner writes on p. 18:

“Although a majority of Americans endorse the ICC as a concept, a majority also oppose allowing US soldiers to be tried in the Hague.”

On this basis Drezner infers in the same paragraph that:

“Public attitudes toward the ICC… show that support for multilateralism – as an abstract principle – is weak.”

But why not draw the opposite conclusion from this data? The International Criminal Court is a court of last resort. It is based on the principle of complementarity, which is to say that national courts have primacy over war crimes trials of their own citizens. (For basics about the ICC click here.)

The ICC would kick in only, for those countries under its jurisdiction, in cases where the national government was unable or unwilling to prosecute its own accused war criminals. The US is certainly quite able to do so. The only issue then, is whether it is willing.

It is entirely consistent with support for multilateralism in general and the ICC in particular to argue that the US should support the court, and also never allow a US soldier to be tried in the Hague. No US soldier would ever be tried in the Hague, even if the US were a signatory to the court, as long as those soldiers accused of war crimes faced due process here at home. For which the USG is already obligated anyway under the Geneva Conventions.

Such a seemingly paradoxical set of survey answers then might be interpreted as support for multilateralism – support for the USG complying with its existing multilateral obligations to hold its own soldiers accountable. If we were willing to do this consistently, we’d have nothing to fear from joining the ICC.

Video Worth Watching of the Week...

Kosovo Redux

More evidence that rumors of a new blood-bath in the Balkans, following Kosovo’s recent pledge to declare independence have been greatly exaggerated:

Al Jazeera reported today: “The Serbian government has threatened to go to the International Court of Justice to prevent Kosovo from being recognised as a state.”

This move, an appeal to an international body that has less power than the Pet Court, underscores Serbia’s unwillingness to prevent Kosovar secession by force.

Negotiators could not have openly agreed to independence, but nor will the central government revisit 1998-1999 through a military effort to prevent it. Too much is at stake with efforts to join the EU. The Kosovoar Albanians know this and had no incentive to compromise, which is why talks failed.

What we are likely to see here is a peaceful transition overseen by the international community. Nations that opposed the JNA’s suppression of the Kosovar Albanians’ uprising in the 1990s will recognize an independent Kosovo. Those that fear setting a precedent vis a vis their own secessionist movements will hem and haw in the General Assembly and fail to recognize Kosovo. And life will go on.

Welcome, For Better or Worse.

We are a junior political scientist and a soldier of misfortune who have been arguing since childhood about political ethics and global social order. The basic question that informs our discussions is how, whether and on what terms the gap might be closed between national and human security. Can global governance "as if people mattered" be achieved?

As you will see, this range of interests gives us plenty of room to maneuver. Besides military doctrine, international law, and global civil society do not be surprised if you find the topics on this blog to include, among others: 1) the care and feeding of young megalomaniacs; 2) the relationship of science fiction and video games to geopolitics 3) and the so-called universality of human rights (cannibalism: barbaric primitive practice, or the other, other white meat?).

Why blog at all, and why now? We have different reasons.

Diodotus: "Political science today prizes abstract theorizing and number crunching over practical wisdom for citizens and statespersons. But as Einstein said, 'Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.' Theory may be my bread and butter, but one hungers to be of use to the real world. It has taken me a few years and some inspiration from other academic bloggers to recognize that six hours a week with students is not enough."

Cleitus the Black: "Why, I choose to blog so the radiance of my inspired eloquence may illuminate the the grey matter of the downtrodden masses, of course! People should actually thank me for doing their thinking for them; it's "outsourcing" at its very best!"

Our blog’s name reflects the influence of Orson Scott Card, who foresaw the political blogosphere back in the late ‘80s when writing his famous novel Ender's Game. In the story, two brilliant middle-schoolers manage to influence world events by writing polemical commentaries under the pseudonyms “Locke” and “Demosthenes.” Of course all possible variations of those derivative titles were snapped up by other Card fans long before we took to the blogosphere ourselves, so we drew on one of our favorite Card quotes instead.

As for our own psuedonyms, interpret them as you please. We hope you enjoy reading and participating in our virtual debates, and if you find the material useful or illuminating, please feel free to recommend this page to your friends and enemies alike.